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Decision science: from Ramsey to dual process theories

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Abstract

The hypothesis that human reasoning and decision-making can be roughly modeled by Expected Utility Theory has been at the core of decision science. Accumulating evidence has led researchers to modify the hypothesis. One of the latest additions to the field is Dual Process theory, which attempts to explain variance between participants and tasks when it comes to deviations from Expected Utility Theory. It is argued that Dual Process theories at this point cannot replace previous theories, since they, among other things, lack a firm conceptual framework, and have no means of producing independent evidence for their case.

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Correspondence to Nils-Eric Sahlin.

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The authors appear in no particular order. The authors wish to thank Jonathan Baron and Niklas Vareman for valuable comments.

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Sahlin, NE., Wallin, A. & Persson, J. Decision science: from Ramsey to dual process theories. Synthese 172, 129–143 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9472-5

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-009-9472-5

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